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JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1992), and the Order of the 
Supreme Court of Utah, dated July 26, 1993, pouring-over this 
case. 
-a-
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Pursuant to Rule 24(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, West One submits the following Statement of Issues as 
more properly framing the issues that are before the Court: 
1. May a creditor rely on § 70A-9-318(3), Utah Code 
Ann. to subordinate the rights of another creditor with a prior 
perfected security interest? 
2. Did West One's Notice of Assignment to Life of 
Virginia contractually obligate West One to notify Life of 
Virginia of United Underwriters, Inc.'s default in order to 
establish West One's priority as a secured creditor? 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
1. Section 70A-9-201, Utah Code Ann.; 
Except as otherwise provided by this act 
a security agreement is effective according 
to its terms between the parties, against 
purchasers of the collateral and against 
creditors. Nothing in this chapter validates 
any charge or practice illegal under any 
statute or regulation thereunder governing 
usury, small loans, retail installment sales, 
or the like, or extends the application of 
any such statute or regulation to any 
transaction not otherwise subject thereto. 
2. Section 70A-9-318(3), Utah Code Ann.: 
The account debtor is authorized to pay 
the assignor until the account debtor 
receives notification that the amount due or 
to become due has been assigned and that 
payment is to be made to the assignee. A 
notification which does not reasonably 
identify the rights assigned is ineffective. 
If requested by the account debtor, the 
assignee must seasonably furnish reasonable 
proof that the assignment has been made and 
unless he does so the account debtor may pay 
the assignor. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
West One is a secured creditor of United Underwriters, 
Inc. ("UUI"), with a valid, perfected first lien on all of UUI's 
accounts receivable, insurance commissions and bonuses that are 
due and payable to UUI from a number of insurance companies, 
including appellant Life of Virginia. West One's security 
interest was perfected in 1988 to secure the repayment of a $1.5 
million loan. Life of Virginia is both an account debtor and a 
creditor of UUI, owing UUI commissions under a brokerage 
agreement and having loaned UUI $100,000 in 1989. When UUI 
defaulted on its obligations to Life of Virginia, Life of 
Virginia set off UUI's obligation to it with approximately 
$123,000 in funds that it owed UUI. The funds retained by Life 
of Virginia constituted an account receivable that was subject to 
West One's perfected security interest. 
This matter was submitted to the trial court on cross 
motions for summary judgment. Judge Iwasaki entered an order 
granting summary judgment in favor of West One on May 28, 1993. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Appellant unlawfully interfered with West One's 
prior, perfected security interest in UUI's accounts receivable. 
The law in Utah is clear: An Article Nine secured creditor with 
a prior perfected security interest has priority over "anyone, 
anywhere, anyhow." Insley Manufacturing Corp, v. Draper Bank & 
Trust, 717 P.2d 1341 (Utah 1986). When Life of Virginia set off 
UUI's obligation with funds it owed UUI, it was acting as a 
creditor of UUI in derogation of West One's rights. The fact 
that appellant was also an account debtor of UUI does not alter 
the rules of priority as between two creditors. As an account 
debtor, Life of Virginia was authorized to pay UUI until it was 
instructed to pay West One directly. Life of Virginia was not 
authorized to apply West One's collateral to satisfy a debt owed 
by UUI to itself. 
2. Appellant's Statement of Issues is misleading and 
incorrect, and the matters being raised by appellant for the 
first time should not be considered on appeal. 
a. Appellant's right of set off did not accrue before 
it received the notice of assignment from West One. 
Appellant's statement that "[appellant's] right ... to 
retain commissions ... accrued before [it] received 
notice of assignment" is wholly incorrect and 
unsupported by the record. The undisputed evidence is 
directly contrary to this assertion: Appellant 
received West One's Notice of Assignment in December 
1987. Brief of Appellant, p. 3. Appellant loaned 
funds to UUI in March 1989 and later that year set off 
UUI's obligation by retaining commissions it owed UUI. 
Id. at p. 4. West One's rights as a secured creditor 
were perfected in 1988, prior to the time appellant 
became a creditor of UUI and therefor prior to the time 
appellant's right of set off accrued. 
b. West One will not receive a "double payment." 
There is simply no evidence to support appellant's 
assertion that West One will reap a double benefit if 
appellant is required to turn over to West One the 
funds it set off. Appellant "presumes" that UUI used 
the funds it borrowed from appellant to make payments 
to West One. There is absolutely no evidence regarding 
UUI's use of the borrowed funds and appellant's "double 
payment" theory is meritless and irrelevant. 
c. West One's rights as a secured creditor were 
perfected upon filing; they were not "exercisable only 
on default of UUI," and the "failure to establish the 
date of default by UUI" is irrelevant. Appellant is 
attempting to inject immaterial issues of fact into 
this appeal. It has never been disputed that West One 
perfected its security interest in UUI's receivables 
long before appellant used the funds it owed UUI to set 
off UUI's obligations. 
d. Appellant's argument should be limited to the 
matters presented to the trial court. Appellant's 
argument to the trial court was that § 70A-9-318(3), 
Utah Code Ann. allows an account debtor to subordinate 
an assignee's prior perfected security interest unless 
the account debtor is specifically instructed to pay 
the assignee. Alternatively, appellant argued, because 
West One gave appellant notice of its assignment, West 
One became "contractually obligated" to notify 
appellant of UUI's default. See generally Memorandum 
in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
filed January 8, 1993. These are the only questions of 
law that are properly before the Court. 
ARGUMENT 
1. LIFE OF VIRGINIA UNLAWFULLY INTERFERED 
WITH WEST ONE'S SECURITY INTEREST IN 
UUI's ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE 
Life of Virginia has apparently confused its rights as 
an account debtor with its rights as a creditor. As an account 
debtor, Life of Virginia had the right, indeed the obligation, to 
pay UUI the commissions and bonuses that it owed UUI unless and 
until it received notice from West One to pay West One directly. 
As a creditor, however, Life of Virginia's right to set off UUI's 
debt with amounts that it owed UUI was subordinate to West One's 
prior, perfected security interest. 
The law in Utah, as well as the overwhelming majority 
of other jurisdictions, is that a creditor's perfected security 
interest in collateral has priority over any subsequent right of 
setoff. See, e.g., Insley Manufacturing Corp. v. Draper Bank & 
Trust, 717 P.2d 1341 (Utah 1986). See also Pioneer Commercial 
Funding Corp. v. United Airlines, Inc., 122 Bankr. 871 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 1991), In re Apex Oil Company, 975 F.2d 1365 (8th Cir. 
1992), First National Bank and Trust Co. of Oklahoma v. Iowa Beef 
Processors, Inc., 626 F.2d 764 (10th Cir. 1980), Griffin v. 
Continental American Life Insurance Co., 722 F.2d 671 (11th Cir. 
1984). See also Annotation, Effect of UCC Article 9 Upon 
Conflict as to Funds in Debtor's Bank Account Between Secured 
Creditor and Bank Claiming Right of Setoff, 3 A.L.R. 4th 998 
(1978). This position reflects the general rule that the rights 
of a secured creditor in collateral are greater than those of any 
other creditor, except as otherwise set forth in Article 9 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code. White & Summers, Uniform Commercial 
Code § 25-2 (1980). 
The Utah Supreme Court's decision in Inslev 
Manufacturing is controlling in this case. There, Insley sold a 
backhoe to Schneider Machinery Sales, receiving a security 
interest in the backhoe and its proceeds, which it properly 
perfected. Schneider sold the backhoe to a third party and 
deposited the proceeds in its account at Draper Bank & Trust 
("Draper"). Because Schneider was in default on an obligation to 
Draper, Draper used the proceeds to set off the unsecured 
obligation of Schneider to the bank, rendering Schneider unable 
to pay Insley for the backhoe. 
Insley sued Draper, asserting that its security 
interest in the proceeds of the backhoe was superior to Draper's 
right of setoff, and that Draper's setoff constituted an improper 
conversion of funds. The Utah Supreme Court agreed. After a 
detailed discussion of the applicability of the Uniform 
Commercial Code to a right of setoff, the Court concluded that 
"the Code's priority rules require that Insley's interest must 
prevail over Draper's right of setoff.... The effect of TUCC 
Section 9-2011 is to give the Article Nine secured party, upon a 
debtor's default, priority over 'anyone, anywhere, anyhow,' 
except as otherwise provided by the remaining Code priority 
rules." Insley Manufacturing, 717 P.2d at 1347 (emphasis added) 
(quoting Continental American Life Insurance Co. v. Griffin, 306 
S.E.2d 285, 287 (Ga. 1983)). 
West One's perfected security interest in commissions 
due from Life of Virginia to UUI is undisputed. Its UCC-1 
financing statement put the world on notice of its claim to these 
commissions. West One took the additional precaution of giving 
Life of Virginia specific notice of its assignment from UUI, 
which Life of Virginia acknowledged in December 1987, more than a 
year before it loaned money to UUI. As a secured party, West 
One's prior perfected interest in the commissions is clearly 
superior to Life of Virginia's right of setoff. 
Life of Virginia has attempted to make an issue of the 
fact that West One did not direct Life of Virginia to make 
payments directly to West One. Life of Virginia again fails to 
recognize the critical distinction between its role as an account 
debtor and its role as a creditor. Although West One may have 
had the right to request direct payments, it had absolutely no 
obligation to due so, and it was fully entitled to rely on the 
strength of its prior perfected security interest. As an account 
debtor, Life of Virginia had a continuing obligation to pay UUI 
until it received notice from West One to make payments directly 
to the bank. West One's failure to make such a demand only 
protects appellant from a claim by West One that appellant should 
not have paid UUI. Appellant has mistakenly leapt to the 
conclusion that West One's silence somehow conferred rights of 
subordination. There is nothing in the case law to support such 
a conclusion. 
It is incumbent on a creditor contemplating setoff to 
search the records and determine whether the property is subject 
to a security interest. See National Acceptance Company of 
America v. Virginia National Bank, 498 Fed. Supp. 1078, 1086 
(E.D. Va. 1980) (because bank made no effort to search the 
appropriate records to determine whether any security interests 
or financing statements had been filed, it was precluded from 
exercising any right of setoff and guilty of conversion of 
secured party's funds). Here, appellant was not even required to 
search the records to determine if UUI's accounts receivable had 
been assigned to a creditor. Appellant had previously received 
notice and acknowledged West One's existing security interest in 
UUI's receivables. 
On the question of whether an assignee must 
specifically request payment from the account debtor or risk 
subordination, Pioneer Commercial Funding Corp. v. United 
Airlines, Inc., 122 Bankr. 871 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991), is 
directly on point. There, Presidential Airways, Inc. 
("Presidential") entered a financing contract with Pioneer 
Commercial Funding Corporation ("Pioneer"). Presidential secured 
its obligation by an assignment of its accounts receivable, which 
was duly perfected by Pioneer. One of Presidential's major 
account debtors was United Airlines, Inc. ("United"). Pioneer 
Commercial Funding, 122 Bankr. at 875. 
Prior to the financing arrangement between Presidential 
and Pioneer, Presidential borrowed $3.5 million from United on an 
unsecured basis. When Presidential defaulted on its obligation 
to United, United set off the amount it owed to Presidential and 
applied it to Presidential's outstanding debt. Pioneer filed an 
action against United alleging conversion and tortious 
interference with contract, claiming that United knew of the 
assignment when it took the setoff. Id. at 876. United defended 
the action under a number of theories, including Pioneer's 
failure to specifically demand payment from United. Id. at 882. 
Interpreting § 70A-9-318(3) of New York's Uniform 
Commercial Code, which is identical to § 70A-9-318(3), Utah Code 
Ann., the Court declared United's position to be erroneous: 
"United then takes a drastic, and unsupported, leap to its 
contention that since Pioneer does not allege making such a 
payment demand, a fortiori, its rights are subordinated to those 
of United.... This view is simply erroneous." Id. 
Life of Virginia is attempting to take the same drastic 
and unsupported leap in its logic. There is no dispute that West 
One did not deliver a payment demand directly to appellant as an 
account debtor. West One agrees that appellant never had an 
obligation to pay West One directly. Nevertheless, appellant had 
an obligation as a creditor to apprise itself of prior perfected 
security interests before exercising a setoff. As the holder of 
a valid first priority perfected security interest in commissions 
due from Life of Virginia, West One's rights are superior to 
"anyone, anywhere, anyhow," including Life of Virginia. See 
Insley Manufacturing, 717 P.2d at 1347. 
2. APPELLANT'S STATEMENT OF ISSUES IS MISLEADING AND 
INCORRECT, AND MATTERS RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME 
ON APPEAL SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED. 
Most of appellant's "issues," and a large part of its 
arguments, are wholly unsupported by the record and should not be 
considered by the Court. See Uckerman v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. 
Co., 588 P.2d 142 (Utah 1978) (appellate court will not consider 
any facts not properly cited to or supported by the record). 
Moreover, this matter was submitted to the trial court 
on joint motions for summary judgment. There are no disputed 
facts. Appellant's only arguments to the trial court were that 
§ 70A-9-318(3), Utah Code Ann. allows an account debtor to 
subordinate an assignee's prior perfected security interest 
unless it is specifically instructed to pay the assignee, and 
that West One's notice of assignment "contractually obligated" 
West One to notify appellant of UUI's default. 
Appellant now claims that its right to retain 
commissions accrued before it received the notice of UUI's 
assignment to West Onef that West One will reap a "double 
benefit" if appellant is required to disgorge the commissions, 
and that West One's rights were exercisable only on UUI's 
default. These arguments were never raised in the trial court, 
and they should not be considered on appeal.1 See Lane v. 
Messer, 731 P.2d 488 (Utah 1986) (issue not raised by pleadings 
and not addressed by trial court may not be raised for first time 
on appeal). 
Appellant relies heavily on a case from the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Haas v. Metro-
Goldwvn-Mayer Inc., 617 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1980), for its 
argument that West One's notice of assignment was insufficient. 
Appellant neglects to mention that the account debtor in Haas 
1
 Appellant vaguely suggests that its loan to UUI was 
"presumably" used by UUI to keep its note to West One current. 
It also attempts to equate its setoff with actual payment to UUI. 
Both of these arguments ignore the record in this case, statutory 
authority, and the governing case law. 
actually paid the assignor, not another creditor. See Haas, 617 
F.2d at 1139. If appellant had paid the assignor (UUI), West One 
would not have a claim against appellant. But appellant paid 
itself, an unsecured creditor, by retaining funds subject to West 
One's perfected security interest. 
Finally, appellant attempts to rely on § 70A-9-311, 
Utah Code Ann. for the proposition that West One's perfected 
security interest could be "involuntarily transferred" to Life of 
Virginia. Appellant's reliance is misplaced. Section 70A-9-311 
deals with the rights of a debtor, not an assignee. It provides: 
"The debtor's rights in collateral may be voluntarily or 
involuntarily transferred (by way of sale, creation of a security 
interest, attachment, levy, garnishment, or other judicial 
process) notwithstanding a provision in the security agreement 
prohibiting any transfer or making the transfer constitute a 
default." In March 1989, when appellant took an assignment from 
UUI, UUI had nothing left to convey, either voluntarily or 
involuntarily, because its rights had already been assigned to 
West One. See Calimari & Perillo, Contracts (West 2d Ed. 1977), 
§ 18-16 at p. 650 (Once assignee's rights are vested by proper 
notice to account debtor, assignee's rights are vested and can 
not be altered by the assignor or the account debtor). 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant's misplaced reliance on § 70A-9-318(3) does 
not affect the relative priorities of creditors. The fatal 
weakness in appellant's case is revealed in paragraph 10 of 
appellant's Statement of Facts: "On or about March 1, 1989 ... 
UUI assigned to [appellant] all of its right, title and interest 
in and to any and all commissions to which UUI was entitled." In 
March 1989 UUI had no right, title or interest in those 
commissions because it had already assigned them to West One. 
See 4 Corbin on Contracts (West 1960) § 902 at p. 615-16 ("By the 
first assignment, the right became [the first assignee's], so 
that at the time of the second assignment, the assignor had no 
rights and could therefore transfer none.") Appellant knew this 
because it had actual notice of UUI's prior assignment to West 
One. The holding in Insley Manufacturing should govern the 
disposition of this case. Appellant asks the Court to ignore the 
Utah Supreme Court's holding in Insley Manufacturing and overturn 
the trial court's decision. The trial court properly considered 
applicable statutes and governing case law and concluded that the 
rights of a party asserting a right of setoff are subordinate to 
those of a secured creditor. That decision was correct, and West 
One respectfully requests the Court to affirm the trial court's 
decision. 
DATED this Is® day of October 1993. 
CAR0L]O^0l5(SlNffiRY 
JAMESUy. WOODALL 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Counsel for West One Bank, Utah 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
The case was submitted to the Court largely on 
undisputed facts which the Court accepts and adopts as its own 
findings, as follows: 
1. Pursuant to a Brokerage Contract dated October 22, 
1986 and effectively dated January 1, 1984 ("Brokerage Contract") 
between UUI and Life of Virginia, Life of Virginia agreed to pay 
UUI certain insurance commissions. 
2. On or about December 22, 1987, West One loaned UUI 
$1,500,000. The obligation was evidenced by a promissory note 
("Note") in that amount. 
3. To secure payment of the Note, UUI executed and 
delivered to West One a Collateral Pledge Agreement ("Pledge 
Agreement") whereby West One obtained a security interest in, 
among other things, the right to receive certain commissions 
payable to UUI from various insurance companies including the 
commissions due from Life of Virginia under the Brokerage 
Contract. 
4. As part of the Pledge Agreement, UUI executed and 
delivered to West One an Assignment dated December 22, 1987 in 
which UUI assigned to West One all sums of money due or to become 
due to UUI from Life of Virginia under the Brokerage Contract. 
5. The Assignment is part of an Assignment of 
Contracts as Collateral dated December 22, 1987 and executed by 
UUI and West One. 
51500 
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6. Paragraph 7.a. of the Assignment of Contracts as 
Collateral provides in part that "Assignor is further authorized 
to direct the companies under any contracts hereafter entered 
into by Assignor, on receipt of written notice from Assignee, to 
pay to Assignee all rents, income, issue and profits accruing 
under the contracts . . . " 
7. In December 1987, West One sent Life of Virginia a 
written Notice of Assignment. The Notice of Assignment provides 
that "upon written notice from [West One], all monies due or to 
become due under the [Brokerage Contract] are to be paid to [West 
One] pursuant to this Assignment." 
8. On December 30, 1987, Life of Virginia 
acknowledged receipt of the Notice of Assignment. 
9. On March 2, 1988, West One perfected its security 
interest in the Brokerage Contract by filing a UCC-1 Financing 
Statement with the Utah Department of Commerce and Commercial 
Code. 
10. On or about March 1, 1989, UUI borrowed $100,000 
from Life of Virginia and executed a promissory note in favor of 
Life of Virginia in that amount. To secure its obligation to 
Life of Virginia, UUI assigned to Life of Virginia all of its 
right, title and interest in and to any and all commissions to 
which UUI was entitled under the Brokerage Contract. 
11. Life of Virginia subsequently used commissions it 
owed to UUI to satisfy UUI's debt on the $100,000 loan. 
51500 
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12. UUI defaulted on the Note and Pledge Agreement 
with West One, and currently owes West One in excess of $668,000. 
13. Until shortly before the filing of this action by 
West One, Life of Virginia was unaware of UUI's default on its 
obligations to West One, and West One never directed Life of 
Virginia to pay West One the commissions owed under the Brokerage 
Contract. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. West One's prior perfected security interest in 
commissions due and owing to UUI gave West One priority over 
"anyone, anywhere, anyhow," Insley Manufacturing Corp. v. Draper 
Bank & Trust. 717 P.2d 1341, 1347 (Utah 1986), including Life of 
Virginia. Life of Virginia's argument that Section 70A-9-318(3), 
Utah Code Ann. and West One's Notice of Assignment required West 
One to give Life of Virginia notice of UUI's default are not 
persuasive. See Pioneer Commercial Funding Corp. v. United 
Airlines, Inc.. 122 Bankr. 875, 882 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
JUDGMENT 
Based upon the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED that 
plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted, and 
defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied, with 
prejudice. And, based upon the representations made to the Court 
by counsel for the parties, JUDGMENT is granted against defendant 
and in favor of plaintiff in the amount of $123,316.54, with 
51500 
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